

Prevention of Crime in and around High schools

The Amsterdam School Safety project

Lessons in implementation

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This paper looks into the question how firm a foundation must be before one may see the birth of an effective crime preventive multi agency approach (including schools, local authorities, police, public transport, city maintenance) in partnership with professionals, pupils, residents and politicians. Using the S&S/DS¹-matrix as a starting point this paper tries to explore the role of the developments stages (denial, awakening, break through, management and integration) in the growth of an integrated school safety and security policy.

Key words: implementation of safety and security policies, multi agency approach, schools, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), Designing Out Crime (DOC), Amsterdam The Netherlands.

Introduction

In 1995 the city of Amsterdam (capital of The Netherlands, a city with about 700,000 inhabitants) started regularly talks with nearly all secondary schools² about crime and insecurity. In a way this was rather a spectacular move because until that day problems with crime and insecurity in and around schools were mainly dealt with on an individual basis. Pupils, teachers, staff, janitors but also police, neighbourhood residents, health and safety officials and public transport defined crime and insecurity as a problem they had to deal with all alone by themselves.

The new approach aimed at most Amsterdam high schools (43 schools with 23,000 pupils and a staff of 2,700) tried to implement a more rational, collective and integrated approach in the three biggest 'school/educational regions' of Amsterdam³. After the installation of three regional steering groups and the signing of an agreement – a contract saying the problems will have to be tackled together - the approach followed 4 steps (Modules, Amsterdam 1996):

- The first step was a survey research amongst pupils and all staff (combining health and safety questionnaire, victim survey and self-report).
- This first step brought the project to a second stage because the results of the survey convinced all lingering participants that the situation looked grim and action had to be taken. It was decided to install focus groups existing mainly of staff and pupils from schools (but sometimes also police, transport, civil servants, local authorities, etc.) interpreting the research results and formulating counter- and preventive measures in six fields: 1. 'school building, surroundings, neighbourhood and travel from/to school' (this focus group mainly looked into CPTED issues), 2. 'rules and enforcement/sanctions', 3. 'victim support, help, follow up care', 4. 'mediation,

¹ Safety & Security/Development Stages.

² Schools from all types educating pupils aged 12 until approximately 18-20

³ Only two smaller school regions in Amsterdam are not yet participating in the approach (region North and South East). Both regions have quite distinct features compared to the rest of Amsterdam.

complaints policies, coaching, school councillors', 5. 'school climate, training of staff and pupils to discuss and handle crime, acts of violence, insecurity' and last but not least there was a sixth focus group looking into 'policy plans, implementation and registration/monitor systems'. The number of measures, ideas, schemes formulated by each of these six focus groups was huge. Furthermore it was shown that most schools were already very active in the field of combating crime and insecurity. However, what was missing was the integration of several efforts until now taken in isolation.

- The third step thus was to formulate priorities first in each of the focus groups, then within the three regional steering groups and finally citywide.
- The fourth step is the implementation and start of the actions and measures.

The type of actions/measures/strategies which was, is and will be implemented is very diverse. This paper will focus on the implementation problems as well as on the CPTED - approach type of measures.

The project is now – after more than 5 years – for most parts in the fourth step and for some parts still in the third step (e.g. there is still no registration/monitor system in place). Some measures are already implemented and some are underway. The project is facing huge implementation problems because so many actors and participant are involved all making their own plans, following their own priorities and speaking their own functional language.

The Netherlands, Amsterdam, schools risky, riskier, riskiest?

Between 1950 and approximately 1965 The Netherlands was – together with Japan – the country with the lowest crime figures in the world. From the mid sixties onwards this situation changed dramatically. The number of crimes registered by the police rose from about 200.000 crimes a year in the mid sixties to more than 1.200.000 crimes a year by the end of the eighties. In the nineties registered crime stabilized and even slowly diminished.

Of course the police clearance rate followed another route from the sixties till the eighties: it went downhill and is now stabilizing somewhere in between 10 and 20%. Metaphorically speaking the police only sees the tip of the crime iceberg: most crimes – e.g. for violence, vandalism and theft less than 10% - are never noticed by the police to be registered. From that small tip of the iceberg only 10-20% is cleared/solved by the police (a tip of the tip)

Victim surveys held in The Netherlands since the mid seventies on a yearly basis (Van Dijk en Steinmetz 1979; more recent figures see www.cbs.nl) show more or less the same trend: uphill until the end of the eighties followed by stabilization and recently a decline⁴.

In the mid nineties the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS, Mayhew & Van Dijk 1997) also shows that The Netherlands have reached the top: 31% of the population became a victim of a crime like theft, vandalism, burglary, robbery or (sexual) violence. The Netherlands as well as England and Wales were situated well above average (24%) in the top of the world crime hit. Though there is a small decline this picture stays more or less the same in the 1999 sweep of the International Crime Victims Survey (Van Kesteren et al 2000, ICVS) as can be seen in table 1:

⁴ Victim Surveys first started in the Netherlands in 1974 by the Ministry of Justice (see Van Dijk & Steinmetz 1979), in the eighties the Central Bureau for Statistics did the work on a yearly and later on two- yearly basis. In the eighties and nineties there were more victim/population surveys launched: the police monitor having the biggest sample (90,000 respondents on a population of 16 million) and also the 'Big Cities Policy monitor' includes a complete set of victim survey questions (including fear of crime, etc.)

Table 1: Overall victimization (ICVS 2000)

Country	% Victimized once or more
AVERAGE	21
Australia	30
England and Wales	26
The Netherlands	25
Sweden	25
Canada	24
Scotland	23
Denmark	23
Poland	23
Belgium	21
France	21
USA	21
Finland	19
Catalonia (Spain)	19
Switzerland	18
Portugal	15
Japan	15
Northern Ireland	15

It is not a very comforting position in the top three but even more interesting is how long it has taken professionals in The Netherlands to understand their position in this respect. After the first ICVS (1989) hardly any one in The Netherlands believed the outcomes of this research. When the Netherlands rank again high in the second ICVS (1992) there is a more rational critique: "the top position can be explained by the extremely high number of bicycle thefts in The Netherlands", so the critique said A unique feature of The Netherlands⁵. After a recount – excluding bicycle theft as if it did not exist – The Netherlands indeed had a lower score but still ranked in the top three. In the third ICVS (1996) a special calculation was made to include the seriousness of each type of crime. It helped a bit: Netherlands ranked second place. As can be seen in table 1 above the most recent ICVS-sweep (1999) shows The Netherlands ranking third place only to be topped by England and Australia.

By the end of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties the facts on crime and insecurity could not be denied any longer. Nation wide policy plans are issued with quite a lot of attention for crime prevention and also for CPTED (Van Soomeren & Woldendorp 1996). In the nineties also the city of Amsterdam issues special policy plans. The local authorities and professionals are obviously no longer denying the facts. They are awake! Moreover they had their 'break through' and are now busy managing the crime problem.

However, for schools this situation is not yet generally reached and there is still some reluctance to face the fact that crime and insecurity are a real problem in The Netherlands, in Amsterdam and in schools. This lingering behind is difficult to explain because within the Netherlands Amsterdam (as the capital city with a young and very diverse population) ranks first in all national crime statistics. Knowing that within any population most offenders and most victims can be found in the age group 10-25 (Junger-Tas et al 1992) schools are obviously at triple risk: The Netherlands ranking high, Amsterdam ranking highest within The Netherlands and schools targeted at youngsters and adolescents aged 10-25 must be the riskiest.

Moreover one can also look at the type of place where crime occurs: e.g. at home, in public space or at work. Research shows the risks at the workplace to be twice as high as the crime risks in public space (British Crime Survey, Mayhew 1995, Van Hoek et al 1996, Huber & Poll 1996). The jobs having the most contacts have the highest risks: public transport, schools/education, shops and

⁵ It certainly is. The change your bike is stolen once (or more times) a year in Amsterdam was 16% in 2000 (it has never been so low).

hospitals/healthcare. The risk in these professions is about four to ten times as big as compared to people walking the street.

Schools in Amsterdam (The Netherlands) are thus a top target for crime prevention probably already since the eighties. Why did it take that long to start a sophisticated crime prevention initiative for schools then? And why did it take so long – see above - for all Dutch authorities to issue a crime prevention policy in general. The answer may be hidden in stages every organization has to pass while building a sound foundation for an integrated safety and security policy.

The 3S development matrix: how mature is a safety and security policy?

Based on the ideas about implementing quality management (Demming 1982, ISO 9001) a group of Dutch experts on crime prevention implementation (Van Hoek et al 1994) have designed a Safety & Security Development Stages matrix: the S&S/DS-matrix (also based on Crosby 1991). This matrix presents the five stages which can be seen to unfold in the course of the development of the foundation of an integrated policy for safety and security: denial, awakening, break through, management and integration.

Scheme 1: S&S/DS-matrix: Safety & Security/Development Stages-matrix
(source DSP, Van Hoek et al 1994)

Development stages integrated safety and security policy	Attitude of management	State of the art of safety and security policy	Approach
Denial	Act after the fact. Crimes are seen in isolation as acts of God	Safety and security are separated from the organization. There is no policy or only ad hoc policy	Problems unknown and no one is allowed to define or research problems. First whistle blowers are ridiculed
Awakening	Safety and security risks are acknowledged, but management is not yet willing to invest in a Safety and Security policy. "Police (or government, or society, or ...) do your job at last so we can do our job (which is not crime nor insecurity)!"	More attention for safety and security issues but main focus is technical (target hardening, security surveillance)	Problems are dealt with in more focussed approach; still no long-range policy. Connection between inside/outside often not yet seen. 'Chain-features' in causal factors and prevention are denied (e.g. CCTV without any ideas about follow up)
Break through	Management learns about risks and looks into costs and consequences. They realize a different approach is necessary and more cost effective.	Safety and security officials connect with management. One manager is now in charge of safety and security policies (but is still RE-acting)	Systems approach: what is the problem, what best practices can solve this problem. Rational deterministic approach.
Management	An active safety and security policy is designed (mission statement and all). If necessary business processes are changed to support safety and security goals	Safety and security connects to adjacent policies like 'health and safety', quality management, labour issues, liability and insurance. A real policy emerges: prevention of incidents and proper procedures if still something goes wrong	More attention for early warning, root causes and chains of causal factors and/or chains of preventive measures. Process approach e.g. using scenarios.
Integration	Safety and security policy is integrated in core business (in processes and culture). Efficient working relations with other stakeholders are normal part of the job and the planning process	Paradoxical: safety and security disappear in other policies like service ("may I help you"), quality, health, environmental policies, etc. Number of security officers and – officials is going down.	Safety and security is integrated in business and processes of all stakeholders. Policies are mainly proactive. Target hardening, hard-nosed security and law enforcement are seen as last resort solutions (ultimum remedium).

Denial

Having looked at the general crime trends in the Netherlands it is difficult to explain why schools in Amsterdam, but also police, neighbourhood residents, health and safety officials and public transport defined crime and insecurity that long as a problem they had to deal with by themselves. Certainly until the beginning of the nineties but also still in 1995 by the start of a sophisticated Safety and Security policy in and around the high schools of Amsterdam the development stage in schools was still mostly stuck in the 'denial mode'. At best the problems with crime and insecurity were defined as 'vandalism problems': youngsters purposefully demolishing public objects, breaking a few windows and playing a bit to rowdy. For these vandalism problems an approach in which schools could participate if they wished to do so had already been developed more than a decade before (for an overview see Van Dijk, Van Soomeren and Walop 1988⁶). This anti-vandalism policy had more or less faded away by the end of the eighties due to changes in personnel and due to organizational changes within the city governance of Amsterdam: the city management/bureaucracy was decentralized in nearly 20 separate city quarters and hence the centrally implemented anti-vandalism policy simply evaporated.

Awakening

Of course the shift from denial to awakening was helped by factual information about the crime - and insecurity situation in the Netherlands (see above), in Amsterdam and in schools (SBR 1990, Mooij, 1994). However, most of this knowledge was already publicly available for years, but it stayed laying there dormant. The awakening for schools in Amsterdam was actively helped by a push from the health and safety officials from the city of Amsterdam who simply followed new regulations issued by the National Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. These regulations – since 1995 part of the Health and Safety Act (Arbeidsomstandighedenwet) – forced employers to take precautionary measures against aggression, violence and sexual intimidation at the workplace (see also: Van Oosten, Steinmetz, Van Soomeren 1995; Steinmetz & De Savornin Lohman 1995). Two groups of officials from the city of Amsterdam now realized they were more or less pursuing the same cause: on one side the health and safety officials and on the other side a newly appointed – but very experienced⁷ - project coordinator for school security. Health and safety officials looked only at the staff (teachers, management, administrators, technical staff/facility-management in schools). The project coordinator for the school security was mainly driven by his task to help implement a new city wide policy plan aiming at 'youth (in general) and safety' in Amsterdam. Within this broader policy there was also substantial funding for a big school project available. The officials of the city of Amsterdam (health/safety + school security) asked two private firms (DSP + SAO, authors of this paper) and the Institute for Post Doctorate Education (of e.g. teachers, staff, etc from schools) to help formulate a policy. This public private partnership – a rather unique construction - joined under the name 'Amsterdam Partnership for Safety and Security on Schools'. The first tasks of this partnership were to start a diagnostic research in all high schools.

A break through: research showing the risks, victims, offenders and incidents

The diagnostic research (Van Dijk & Frielink 1998; Van Dijk 1999) started as a pilot for a group of four schools (Esprit scholengemeenschap) and was then held in the eastern region (1997), then also the western region (1998) and later on (1998/1999) also in the southern school region of Amsterdam. This rather 'crumbled' step by step approach reflects the necessary efforts to gain the

⁶ For detail: Van Dijk, Van Soomeren & Walop 1981a, 1981b, 1981c, 1982a, 1982b, 1983, 1984a, 1984b.

⁷ This project coordinator had been the chairman of the steering group for the 'anti-vandalism policy' mentioned earlier which had started in 1981 and which had faded away by the end of the eighties.

participation of the schools⁸ as well as the methodological difficulties in combining separate research traditions. In fact this research for the first time established a structural liaison between schools within one region concerning crime and insecurity issues. Another unique feature of this research was that it succeeded in combining three types of diagnostic research:

- a general questionnaire for staff and personnel following the standard model of a 'risk assessment questionnaire on health and safety' (as obliged by the Health and Safety act mentioned earlier);
- a victim survey questionnaire for pupils and staff using the model for standard Crime Victims Survey (Van Dijk & Steinmetz 1979, ICVS 1989/1992/1996/2000);
- a self-report questionnaire asking pupil to indicate what incidents they committed or witnessed in and around their school; the standard Dutch national 'youth and crime self report study' was used as a basis here (Junger-Tass et al 1992).

Integrating this different types of research each having its own tradition and background proved to be a difficult job which could only succeed because this research was a combined effort of health and safety researchers (GG&GD Amsterdam) and researchers specialised in victim and self report crime research (DSP/SAO).

Victimisation (staff and pupils), incidents and seriousness of offences/offenders

Table 2 summarises the main results of the research; note that in table 2 the first pilot research in 4 schools (3,400 pupils/470 staff) is excluded because the results are difficult to compare.

Table 2: Number of incidents (staff/pupils) a year as reported by victims and (self) reported by offending pupils (based on Van Dijk & Frielink 1998, Van Dijk 1999)

	West 13 schools research in 1998	East 12 schools research in 1997	South 14 schools research 98/99	Total 39 schools 1997-1999
PUPILS				
number of pupils	5,133	5,063	9,040	19,236
number of incidents from victim survey	41,000	46,000	68,000	155,000
number of incidents from self report; from which:	77,000	71,000	96,000	244,000
- serious incidents	30,000	28,000	36,000	94,000
% known to school	15%	15%	16%	15%
% known to police	0.4%	2%	0.7%	1%
STAFF				
number of staff	506	647	1,059	2,212
number of incidents from victim survey	3,000	6,000	4,000	13,000

Sample size staff 2,212, pupils 23%-27% of 19,236. Response rate staff 50-70%, pupils 80-90%. Incidents: aggression/violence, burglary, sexual intimidation, arson, vandalism/graffiti/demolishing objects, theft, nuisance (bullying, conflicts). Seriousness ranking: see Steinmetz 2001

The number of incidents a year astonished every one; not only the number of incidents reported by victims (staff and pupils), but maybe even more the number of incidents reported by the offending pupils themselves. Also the fact that about 40% of all incidents were serious incidents⁹ convinced people that action had to be taken. The research showed that schools only had knowledge about 15% of all incidents. For the police this figure was about 1%. Pupils themselves knew far more

⁸ Schools participated heavily in the organisation, implementation and execution of the research, To bring costs down the questionnaire was made by professional researchers who also did the analyses and reporting (as well as the overall management). Within the schools the questionnaires were distributed to all staff/personnel and to a sample (1 in 4) of the pupils and then collected again and sent to the researchers.

⁹ About 10% (East/South) to 14% (west) of the pupils can be called 'repeating offenders'. They report committing more than 14 (serious) incidents a year.

incidents compared to the school and the police. Pupils talk about these incidents with other pupils (in East this was 31%; in West: 33% and in South 49%).

The research also showed that young pupils committed more incidents than older pupils. This result resembles the result of a research done in primary schools in Amsterdam (pupils aged 4-12). Children start committing incidents/crimes at the age of 10 (Van Barlingen et al 1997). Boys report they commit more incidents than girls and boys are also more often a victim of incidents. Last but not least the research showed there were some important regional difference. From the perspective of crime victimisation studies, self report research and risk assessment studies these results were not extremely surprising: on a world scale The Netherlands rank high in the crime charts and Amsterdam ranks high within that country and last but not least schools (youth/workplace contacts) are a risky part of society. However the reactions within schools were very surprised, shocked and sometimes even angry. But evidently this thorough research has brought most schools to the development stage of a 'break through' as mentioned in the S&S/DS-matrix presented before. Schools – as well as other institutes like authorities, police, etc. – started to ask themselves questions like "how come there are so many and such serious incidents", "what can be done about this", "Why shouldn't we work together to combat crime and insecurity".

Start of the management stage: six types of focus groups

It was decided to install focus groups existing mainly of staff and pupils from schools but in the case of the 'CPTED-group' also including police, public transport, civil servants, local authorities and maintenance officials. The aim of the focus groups was to interpret the research results for their region and formulate counter- and preventive measures in six fields: 1. 'school building, surroundings, neighbourhood and travel from/to school'. This focus group mainly looked into CPTED issues. 2. 'rules and enforcement/sanctions'. 3. 'victim support, follow up care' (Van Hoek & Steinmetz 1999). 4. 'mediation, complaints policies, coaching, school councillors'. 5. 'school climate, training of staff and pupils to discuss and handle crime and insecurity'. 6. 'policy plans, implementation and registration/monitor systems' (Dragt et al 1999). Each focus group had to come forward with measures, ideas, schemes and initiatives and then rank all those ideas in a priority scheme. As an example we will concentrate on the work done by one of these focus groups, the one on 'school building, surroundings, neighbourhood and travel from/to school'; the CPTED focus group.

CPTED focus group

In each region such a (CPTED) focus group was formed. The research had already showed the importance of looking at the routes from and to school and the school neighbourhood and surroundings.

Table 3: Percentage unsafe/insecure places according to pupils

Region	Travel/routes from/to school	Neighbourhood around school	School premises outside	School building inside (entrance, stairs, canteen, gym, etc.)
Esprit pilot4schools	23%	24%	16%	11%
East	28%	23%	12%	10%
West	25%	24%	12%	9%
South	29%	20%	11%	6%
TOTAL ¹⁰	26%	23%	13%	9%

As can be seen in table 3 the pupils perceive the routes from and to school as well as the school neighbourhood as more unsafe and insecure than the school premises and the school building itself.

¹⁰ Unweighted total three region + pilot

Regarding the rooms within the building there is one exception: the gym. This room was perceived as unsafe by a large group of pupils (Esprit 12%; East: 17%; West: 17%; South: 11%). The crime and insecurity problems outside the school were sadly proven by an incident, which happened around this time: several schools in Amsterdam West are located next to a line of the light rail public transport system. There were frequent rows and fights between pupils at the roads to the station and on the platform. One day two girls were fighting on the platform and one of them pushed the other onto the rail where she was killed by the approaching tram/train. This case showed several things: a strict division between 'inside school' and 'outside' is not a very helpful distinction because problems and conflicts often start inside and explode once outside or the other way around. This case also showed the difficult intermingling of problems and solutions and the number of actors involved; possible solutions e.g. were: prevent fights, take quick action when fights are seen or reported (the station was equipped with CCTV but no one monitored the images¹¹), change school hours and thus prevent different schools from clashing in to each other while leaving school, have more tram/train carriages capacity available on peak hours, crowd control, educating pupils about risks and about quick intervention tactics, etc.

The first thing the focus group found out while identifying all measure already taken was that most schools were already very active in the field of combating crime and insecurity.

Table 4: measures taken in all schools regarding building, neighbourhood and routes from/to school

6 groups of concrete measures:	measures implemented (or partly implemented)
Security guards/surveillance in/around school (5 measures)	67%
Architectural/constructional changes in and around school (18 measures)	61%
Maintenance (15 measures)	78%
Canteen and recreational space (4 measures)	50%
Parking facilities for bikes/mopeds/scooters (2 measures)	47%
School neighbourhood and routes from/to school (5 measures)	35%
4 groups of policy/organisation oriented measures:	
Organisation (7 measures)	87%
Policy (7 measures)	67%
Evaluation, registration en training (3 measures)	67%
Cooperation, multi agency, agreements with others (15 measures)	50%

Table 4 shows:

1. the massive number of measures already taken by schools;
2. the relatively low score (35%) of measures aimed at the school neighbourhood and routes from/to school;
3. the relatively low score (47%) of measures aimed at the parking facilities for bikes/mopeds/scooters;
4. the low score (50%) for measures aimed at cooperation between schools, multi agency approach, agreements and arrangements with other actors in the field.

According to the top management of the schools there are indeed a lot of measures implemented but these measures are not really incorporated in sophisticated policy plans. There is no connection between the analysis of the problem, the goals/plans and the measures to be taken. The available knowledge is simply not used (Eklblom 2001). This can also be seen by looking at table 3 and 4: the biggest problem for pupils is the unsafe and insecure situation in the school neighbourhood and the routes from and to school but schools have implemented the least number of measure aiming at this problem and are obviously not heavily investing in cooperation with those who might be able to change this situation; the least number of measures is aimed to cooperation and a multi agency

¹¹ There are experiments in The Netherlands working with 'smart camera's' able to detect e.g. a fight or robbery. When the camera 'sees' a pattern resembling a fight there is an alarm.

approach (see last row table 4). According to top management there is also a profound lack of systematic evaluation of measures already implemented. In short: there is a lot of action but it is questionable how effective and efficient this action is¹².

Within each CPTED focus group the schools learned a lot from the practices and experiences of each other and beyond that schools together with officials from police, public transport, city management, etc were able to formulate a set of new and comprehensive measures in the field of e.g. public transport, neighbourhood maintenance, fire prevention and evacuation (Stienstra 2001) and multi agency cooperation (Mölk 1999, Woldendorp 1999). Some of these measures were so simple they were implemented immediately while other plans – e.g. architecture and urban planning – needed more time (Mölk & Van der Bijl 1999, Woldendorp 2001). But

More implementation problems: organisation structure lagging behind and the evaporation of a vision

Having reached this stage of maturity in the policy management (see scheme 1 again) a mayor problem did arise: after all the work done in the six focus groups it appeared that an overview of all measures and actions was completely missing. The people in one focus group could not relate to the measures taken within other focus groups. Somehow the general picture had evaporated. Every one was now aware that a crime and insecurity problem existed (see stage 'break through' in scheme 1). Several focus groups within one region had come up with good ideas on how to connect measures, which were already taken to new measures, but the general picture for all the focus groups together was just not there.


This problem had to do with the lack of an overall organisation. There still was no project leader or – coordinator. There was only the public private 'Amsterdam Partnership for Safety and Security on Schools'. A partnership including the city of Amsterdam, the schools (organised in three regions each having a regional project coordinator) and three firms/institutes. It was decided to install one project leader elected by the schools. Furthermore the firms/institutes stepped a bit back. They had helped to launch this break through of a coordinated multi agency approach and they had done the first steps (analysis, start of cooperation) but now their position had to be a more modest one. From now on the cooperating schools had to set up their own management of the whole policy. A management (see scheme 1) which had to design their own safety and security policy. Hence the firms/institutes retreated again on a more natural role: the supply of training courses, policy advice, research and secretarial labour.

To give the policy a real backbone it was decided that each school should appoint a (part time) school safety and security coordinator. The city of Amsterdam paid each school about 5.000 Euro a year extra for this official. A coordinator is linked to his/hers colleagues through a monthly regional meeting/exchange, a bi-monthly newsletter, a website and a special training for all coordinators. All this of course besides the bi-lateral contacts a coordinator is having with colloquies of other schools and with the staff and teachers, pupils and parents within his own school. Furthermore each coordinator is backed by al small and rather informal working groups within his own school. In this group participate some pupils, teachers, staff members, parents, etc. (the mix differs per school).

After having professionalised and restructured the organisation and management there was still not a general overview of what all focus groups TOGETHER were doing. This problem was – for the time being – solved in an original way: all approaches were summarised in one catching picture:

¹² The same problem can be seen by the registration policies; schools do put effort in the registration of incidents, but when they do registrate incidents they use the personal files of pupils for this purpose. This way there is never a systematic and statistical sound overview available because the registration is completely personalized.

SIASA's walk



This simple picture was able to do what several meetings did not accomplish: every one again knew in one instant what the general idea was and how the cooperation had to work. The picture was a project plan on one page! The following parts can be distinguished in the picture:

1. The road (research, focus groups, priorities, action): the road explains the 'process' mentioned before. First the diagnostic research among pupils and staff, followed by the focus groups to elaborate the research into more practical measures. This was followed by the priorities laid down in so-called implementation plans. This phase was followed by 'action'.

2. SIS en SAS: the 'action' is not only IN school (Safe/Secure In School: SIS) but also AROUND schools (Safe/Secure Around Schools: SAS). As mentioned earlier the division between 'inside school' and 'outside school' can not be used so strict: a conflict between pupils can ignite outside and than explode inside the school (or the other way around); pupils can be a nuisance to the neighbourhood, but they might also be able to help residents and have a good relationship with them while in turn residents can keep a protective eye on the school (school watch) or support the school in other practical ways. In short: SIS as well as SAS is needed.

Safe/Secure Around School (SAS; the CPTED approach) is pictured in the legs while SIS is the rest of the picture.

3. Pupils and staff/personnel: the picture has a pupils side and a staff side. Pupils certainly need more attention because they know of more incidents, commit more incidents and are the victim of more incidents than staff. These both sides are pictured in the arms. Everything mentioned in the middle of the picture can be used by either pupils or staff: this is the organisation and policy.

4. Brain and backbone (school safety and security coordinator): the picture had a central nervous system including:

- brains picturing the policy cycle: analysis, goal setting, making policy plans, implementation and evaluation by registration/monitor;
- the safety and security coordinator as a central backbone within each school, knowing what every one is working on, coordinating the work of all participants and disseminating the information. The coordinator is supported by a working groups of pupils, teachers, staff, parents, by a training, a newsletter, website and regular exchange with his colleagues.

In sum

Thinking back to scheme 1 which introduced the Safety & Security Development Stages matrix (S&S/DS-matrix) we have seen the Amsterdam school safety and security initiative slowly reach the stage of 'management': an active safety and security policy has emerged. Every one is now convinced an integrated multi agency approach is necessary. Safety and security coordinators within each school are connecting with management and a real policy is now formulated not only within the school but also for the different school regions and Amsterdam as a whole. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design is an integrated and very important part of this policy. It took all participants about five years to come from the stage of denying crime and insecurity problem in and around schools to the present stage of an integrated approach, which is managed by one coordinator having his own office (+ secretarial support) who is backed by three regional coordinators and about 40 safety and security coordinators within the schools.

This whole machinery is still pretty weak though. In the – pure theoretical! – case the city of Amsterdam would stop funding this policy tomorrow, schools would most probably not be willing to pay for the integrative machinery by themselves. In that case we also suppose that a substantial number of safety and security coordinators would return to their old jobs. Obviously the last stage in the S&SS-matrix – integration – is not yet completely reached which may come as no surprise since the term 'multi agency approach' is very easily tossed but the implementation of a sophisticated multi agency approach is not light a task and it showed to be a heavy burden in the Amsterdam school safety and security policy.

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